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SUING TEXAS STATE SENATE BILL 8 
PLAINTIFFS UNDER FEDERAL LAW FOR 
VIOLATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Anthony J. Colangelo* 
Many people are deriding (or celebrating) the exceptional—and exceptionally 
deceptive—device of the Texas legislature to so-called “deputize” private 
individuals as government enforcement agents to carry out a state anti-abortion 
law that, at present, violates the U.S. Constitution. The law at issue, commonly 
referred to as Senate Bill 8, is extraordinarily broad, and provides that anyone 
can sue anyone who “aids or abets” an abortion after about six weeks of 
pregnancy (including, if read literally, the Uber driver who drove the woman to 
the clinic).1 The law awards recovery of no less than $10,000 and makes no 
exceptions for pregnancies resulting from incest or rape.2 
Actually, the deceptive nature of the law can be subdivided into three devices. 
I’ll address each in turn with the principal aim of suing someone under federal 
law for bringing suit under the Texas state law. In this respect, I’ll be going quite 
a bit further than those who seek simply to spotlight the unconstitutionality of 
the Texas law. Rather, I’m going after the plaintiff who sues under it. 
First, the Texas law attempts to take “the state”—the traditional defendant in 
such suits—out of the picture, essentially rendering it a private suit between 
private parties. This is of absolutely crucial importance for anyone seeking to 
enforce their rights under federal law—the “supreme Law of the Land” under 
the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.3 For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the 
principal vehicle for vindication of constitutional rights, becomes inoperative 
because there must be “state action” in the deprivation of the right.4 This is, or 
 
 *  Robert G. Storey Distinguished Faculty Fellow and Professor of Law, SMU Dedman 
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 1.  Tex. S.B. 8, 87th Leg., R.S. § 3, subchapter H, secs. 171.201, 171.204, 171.208 (2021) 
(as enrolled May 13, 2021) (codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.201, 171.204, 
171.208). 
 2.  TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.208(b)(2). 
 3.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 4.  Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924, 929 (1982). 
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should be, an easy one in at least one respect: the state enacted the law, and voilà, 
state action. The problem is the state action extends only to enacting the law.5 
We still need to figure out a way to get at the private party suing under it. More 
on that below. 
Second, the Texas law actually prohibits bringing suit against the woman who 
gets the abortion; instead, it goes after those who help her do so.6 But she’s the 
one whose rights are being violated. It then cleverly bans defendants from 
asserting the rights of third parties in general; namely, the women having 
abortions.7 But again, that’s the state law. What about federal law? Here, courts 
have held that “[t]hough, generally speaking, [a constitutional] right . . . is a 
personal right of individuals, this is ‘only a rule of practice’, which will not be 
followed where the identity of interest between the party asserting the right and 
the party in whose favor the right directly exists is sufficiently close.”8 Slam-
dunk. 
Third—and most difficult—under § 1983 the defendant must be acting 
“under color” of law.9 To a non-civil rights lawyer, this may seem obviously 
satisfied: the state plaintiff is acting under color of state law. But that’s not what 
under color of law means. Rather, it is a legal term of art generally considered 
synonymous with “in [an] official capacity”;10 in other words, the actor must be 
clothed with some form of governmental authority. Thus, the private plaintiff 
who brings suit under a state law that is declared unconstitutional would not be 
acting under color of law.11 And hence, the state action requirement rears its 
head again. For the paradigmatic actor under color of law is generally some sort 
of state agent.12 
But not always. Private parties may act under color of law where their conduct 
“may be fairly attributed” to the state.13 To be perfectly honest, this is a really 
hard test to meet, and none of the ways to meet it seem satisfied when it comes 
to bringing suit under the Texas law. But the very principle that private parties 
may act under color of law remains an important one, even if present law does 
not appear capable of attaching it to state law plaintiffs. 
Here’s where the zealous advocate must get creative. Everyone seems 
hypnotized by the novel features of the Texas law as cleverly evading state 
plaintiffs’ liability for violations of constitutional rights. But is there a way to 
use these novel features against themselves? 
To begin—and as we’ve already seen—this is no ordinary law. For example, 
there is no requirement that the plaintiff be harmed in any way.14 So already, this 
 
 5.  Id. at 938–39. 
 6.  TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.206(b). 
 7.  Id. § 171.209(a). 
 8.  Brewer v. Hoxie Sch. Dist. No. 46, 238 F.2d 91, 104 (8th Cir. 1956) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 9.  42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 10.  West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50 (1988). 
 11.  Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937–39 (1982). 
 12.  West, 487 U.S. at 49. 
 13.  Lansing v. City of Memphis, 202 F.3d 821, 828 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 14.  See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.201–.212. 
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doesn’t look like a typical civil suit. Rather, it looks more like the state is using 
private individuals as surrogates for public prosecutors enforcing a state penal 
law. And, it turns out, there is a test for this very sort of thing in the field of 
Conflict of Laws. For whether a law is penal “depends upon . . . whether its 
purpose is to punish an offense against the public justice of the state, or to afford 
a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act.”15 Again—to 
reiterate—the Texas law requires no injury.16 Or take Justice Cardozo’s 
formulation: a statute is penal when it “awards a penalty to the state, or to a 
public officer in its behalf, or to a member of the public, suing in the interest of 
the whole community to redress a public wrong. The purpose must be, not 
reparation to one aggrieved, but vindication of the public justice.”17 Again—to 
reiterate—the Texas law requires no injury,18 and thus no “reparation to one 
aggrieved.”19 Under these tests, the Texas law looks quintessentially penal. 
And who enforces penal law? State prosecutors acting under color of law. 
And in this regard, the Supreme Court has said that state action may be “present 
if the private entity has exercised powers that are ‘traditionally the exclusive 
prerogative of the State.’”20 It is difficult to imagine an action more 
“traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State” than bringing a criminal 
prosecution.21 
So, to return to where we started, it is not mere hyperbole to say the state has 
“deputized” private individuals.22 That is in fact and law exactly what the state 
has done, and it has removed all the constitutional protections that attend a 
criminal trial along the way. If some private individual chooses to step into the 
role of deputy prosecutor, he should also be deemed to open himself up to 
remedies against his unconstitutional acts. 
 
 
 15.  Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673–74 (1892). 
 16.  See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.201–.212. 
 17.  Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 198 (N.Y. 1918) (emphasis added) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 18.  See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.201–.212. 
 19.  Loucks, 120 N.E. at 198. 
 20.  Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1982) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 
U.S. 345, 352 (1974)); see also Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 
(2019). 
 21.  Yaretsky, 457 U.S. at 1005. 
 22.  Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, No. 21A24, 2021 WL 3910722, at *3 (U.S. Sept. 1, 
2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
